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The author proposes his take on the EU 
sanctions against Russia. He aims to un-
derstand the legal nature of the EU restric-
tions, the exact procedure of their im-
plementation, revision, and repeal, as well 
as their judicial review. To this end, he 
proposes a system of sanction classifica-
tion, analyses current EU legislation on the 
imposition and implementation of sanc-
tions, as well as the case law on the sanc-
tion policy. 
The author also examines EU sanctions 
imposed on other countries and compares 
them to the Russian ones. He thus comes up 
with the following classification of sanc-
tions against Russia: individual sanctions, 
those targeted at Crimea and Sevastopol, 
and anti-Russian economic sanctions. He 
concludes that the EU sanctions against 
Russia are inconsistent with the legal na-
ture of restrictive measures, since they are 
a punishment rather than a policy tool. 
The author believes that in the current 
political conditions it may be difficult for 
the European Union to reach a unanimous 
agreement to repeal or prolong the sanc-
tions. 
This article is inspired by the discus-
sions that took place during the interna-
tional conference “Russia and the EU: the 
Question of Trust” held in Luxembourg on 
November, 28—29 (2014). 
 
Key words: Russia, European Union, 
restrictive measures, sanctions 
 
 
The EU policy of imposing restric-
tive measures (sanctions) on third 
countries has a long history [1]. The 
EU imposes restriction on third count-
ries and non-state structures, natural 
and legal persons as a response to their 
political actions. 
In accordance with the principles 
contained in the Guidelines on imple-
mentation and evaluation of restrictive 
measures (sanctions) in the framework 
of the EU Common Foreign and Secu-
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rity Policy [2] (further referred to as Guidelines on Implementation of Re-
strictive Measures), restrictive measures (sanctions) can be defined as meas-
ures taken by the EU Council (further referred to as the Council) within a 
common foreign and security policy against certain states, organisations, and 
citizens to bring about a change in the policy or activities of this state, part of 
a state, government, entities, or individuals in compliance with the purposes 
of the EU foreign policy formulated in Article 21 of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (further referred to as TFEU). 
The legal framework for imposing sanctions is provisions of Chapter 2, 
section V of the Treaty on the European Union (further, TEU), as well as 
Articles 75 and 215 of TFEU. 
It is worth stressing that the EU legal vocabulary uses the term ‘sanc-
tions’ alongside the term ‘restrictive measures’. However, the primary and 
secondary legislation acts use the notion of ‘restrictive measures’. In this 
article, both terms will be used interchangeably. 
In accordance with the current EU legislation, sanctions are imposed in 
two stages. At the first stage, the Council adopts a decision in the framework 
of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and in compliance with 
Article 29 TEU. This decision contains a list of measures, persons and enti-
ties subject to sanctions, as well as reasons for their imposition. 
At the second stage, the measures foreseen in the Council Decision are 
implemented either at the EU or at the national level. Measures such as arms 
embargoes or restrictions on admission and visa bans are implemented di-
rectly by the member states, which are legally bound to act in conformity 
with the Council decisions. [2]. 
Other measures breaking down or suspending economic relations (in-
cluding freezing funds and economic resources) with a third country are im-
plemented by means of regulations, adopted by the Council, acting by quali-
fied majority, on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission, under Article 
215 TFEU. 
According to Article 288 TFEU, such regulations are generally applied and 
should be binding in their entirety and are observed in all member states. As any 
other EU acts, they are subject to judicial review by the Court of Justice. 
The year 2014 was crucial for the EU sanction policy. The European Un-
ion adopted a package of restrictive measures targeting the Russian Federa-
tion — the EU’s third largest trade partner. In view of the pre-sanction level 
of EU-Russia relations, it is worth stressing that the adoption of economic 
restrictive measures was a serious challenge both to Russia and the European 
Union. 
This article aims to study the EU sanctions against the Russian Federa-
tion, the procedures of their implementation, revision, repeal, and judicial 
review. At the moment, one can identify three types of sanctions targeting 
Russia. 
The first type, which can be called ‘individual’ sanctions, targets certain 
people and organisations responsible, according to the EU, for violating the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The first package of individ-
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ual sanctions was adopted on March 17, 2014. Individual sanctions suggest 
restrictions on admission, visa bans, and freezing of assets of certain natural 
and legal persons. 
Another type of sanctions is restrictive measures for Crimea and Sevas-
topol adopted on June 23, 2014 in response to the incorporation and full in-
tegration of the peninsula into the Russian Federation. 
The third type of sanctions is, strictly speaking, anti-Russian economic 
sanctions adopted on July 31, 2014 after the Malaysian Boeing crash. These 
sanctions can be qualified as ‘anti-Russian,’ since their adoption followed 
the EU’s officially accusation of Russia of the crisis in Ukraine. 
As of late December 2014, the EU Council adopted approximately 30 
acts imposing restrictive measures against the Russian Federation. All acts of 
the Council imposing sanctions against Russia can be roughly divided into 
basic and additional ones. The basic acts include decisions and regulations 
launching a certain types of sanctions (individual, those for Crimea and Se-
vastopol, and economic ones). Additional acts are decisions and regulations 
used to amend and update basic acts. 
Within the above classification, one can identify the following basic acts: 
1) Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of March 17, 2014 [3, р. 16—21] 
and the Council Regulation (EU) N 269/2014 of March 17, 2014 [4, р. 6—15] 
imposing individual sanctions; 
2) Council Decision 2014/386/CFSP of June 23, 2014 [5, р. 70—71] 
and the Council Regulation (EU) N 692/2014 of June 23, 2014 [6, р. 9—14] 
concerning restrictions on goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol and 
any investment in the peninsula; 
3. Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of July 31, 2014 [7, р. 3—17] and 
the Council Regulation (EU) N 833/2014 of July 31, 2014 [8, р. 1—11] im-
posing anti-Russian economic sanctions. 
All other acts (the Council Decision, the Council Implementation Deci-
sion, the Council Regulation, the Council Implementation Regulation) are 
additional ones. 
In accordance with the key principles outlined in the Guidelines on Im-
plementation of Restrictive Measures, sanctions are a preventive and non-
punitive instrument. Therefore, restrictive measures cannot be a punishment 
for any actions. Therefore, based on their nature, restrictive measures are 
adopted to bring about a change in policy or activity by the target country, 
part of country, government, entities or individuals. 
As to the sanction policy against Russia, restrictive measures were ado-
pted disregarding this principle. From the very beginning of the sanction po-
licy against Russia, it has been evident that restrictive measures would not 
bring about a change in the country’s policies. Therefore, sanctions were 
adopted not as a preventive measures, but as a punishment for the Russian 
actions in Crimea and South-East Ukraine, which, from the EU’s perspec-
tive, violated the principles of international law. This conclusion follows 
from the preamble to the Council Regulation (EU) N 833/2014 (paragraph 
2): “It is therefore considered appropriate to apply additional restrictive 
measures with a view to increasing the costs of Russia's actions to under-
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mine Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence and to 
promoting a peaceful settlement of the crisis”. This justification shows that 
the major purpose of restrictive measures was not bringing about a change in 
Russia’s policies but rather punishing the country. 
As of early December 2013, the EU sanctions against Russia included 
the following restrictions: 
1) restrictions on admission and visa bans for individuals; 
2) freezing of assets and economic resources for natural and legal per-
sons; 
3) prohibition on goods originating from Crimea or Sevastopol and re-
striction on investment in these territories; 
4) prohibition on the sales, transfer, or export of goods and technologies 
for the military and oil industries; 
5) prohibition on imports and exports of arms from/in Russia (arms em-
bargo); 
6) prohibition on provision of financial services to Russian banks and 
other financial restrictions. 
The measures relating to arms embargo, restrictions on admission, and 
visa bands are to be implemented at the national level. Visa bans are en-
forced through entering the data on certain individual into the Schengen In-
formation System in compliance with Article 25 of Council and European 
Parliament Regulation N 1987/2006 [9, р. 4—23]. 
According to the Guidelines on Implementation of Restrictive Measures, 
the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU at the 
time of the adoption of the instrument containing the lists is responsible for 
entering the data in the Schengen Information System. That state is respon-
sible for any necessary updates, corrections and/or deletions. 
In order to mitigate the negative effects for European companies, the EU 
Council included a rule in Regulations N 833/2014 (Article 11) and  
N 692/2014 (Article 6) that prohibits the satisfaction of claims in connec-
tion with any contract or transaction, whose performance has been affected 
by the restrictive measures. Moreover, in accordance with the provisions of 
above regulations, in any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the 
onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not affected by the sanctions is 
on the claimant. In other words, the onus of proving that the restrictive 
measures do not prohibit a certain transaction is not on the European com-
pany which refuses to perform a contract in reference to the sanctions, but on 
the person that demands contract performance. 
Of course, these provision violate the basic principles of civil law [10]. 
In accordance with the established practice, the European Union adopts re-
strictive measures for a certain period or without specifying such period under 
the condition that these measures will be revised as the situation changes. The 
time limit of restrictive measures is established only by the Council Decisions, 
regulations do not contain such details. In the case of Russia, restrictive meas-
ures were imposed for a period from six to twelve months. 
The first group of sanctions was adopted in accordance with the Council 
Decision N 2014/145/CFSP of March 17, 2014 until September 17, 2014. 
the Council Decision N 2014/658/CFSP of September 8, 2014 renewed sanc-
tions until March 15, 2015. 
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The second group of sanctions concerning Crimea and Sevastopol was 
adopted by the Council Decision N 2014/386/CFSP until June 23, 2015. 
The third group of economic sanctions was adopted until July 31, 2015 
(the Council Decision N 2014/512/CFSP of July 31, 2014). 
Moreover, the Council Decisions stress that restrictive measures should 
be revisited on a regular basis in view of the current situation. 
The current EU legislation provides a possibility for challenging the im-
posed sanctions in court. 
In accordance with Article 263 TFEU, the EU Court of Justice reviews 
the legality of legislative acts and acts of the Council. According to Article 
275 TFEU, the EU Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction over the pro-
visions relating to the common foreign and security policy. However, this 
rule does not extend to the claims of natural and legal persons regarding the 
revision of restrictive measures. It means that the Council decisions and 
regulations on imposing restrictive measures can be challenged in court at 
suits of natural and legal persons against which these measures were im-
posed. In other words, claimants in such cases can be companies and indi-
viduals, but not Russia as a state subject to sanctions. 
As of today, a number of Russian companies and individuals have chal-
lenged the Council Decision on imposing sanctions at the EU Court of Jus-
tice (Vnesheconombank v Council, case T-737/14; Gazprom Neft v Council, 
case T-735/14; VTB v Council, case T-734/14; Sberbank of Russia v Coun-
cil, case T-732/14; Rosneft v Council, case T-715/14; Rotenberg v Council, 
cases T-720/14 and T-717/14). 
In the above cases, the claimants are companies and a natural person 
subject to sanctions. According to Articles 263 and 275 TFEU, other persons 
also have the right to bring a claim if the sanctions affect them directly and 
individually. Therefore, to bring a claim, a person not included in the sanc-
tion list has to prove that, firstly, they are directly affected by the sanctions 
and, secondly, that sanctions are of ‘individual concern’ to them. 
For instance, in the case of Plaumann & Co. v Commission [11], the 
Court ruled that the persons other than those addressed in the challenged de-
cision have the right to appeal if that decision affects them due to certain at-
tributes peculiar to them or due to circumstances differentiating them from 
all other persons, therefore this decisions distinguishes them individually just 
as in the case of the person addressed. 
As mention above, Russia is not the first country subject to the EU re-
strictive measures. The EU Court of Justice has considered numerous cases 
challenging sanctions. In some cases, the EU Court of Justice accepts the 
claimants’ arguments and satisfies the application for annulment of the 
Council Decision on imposing sanctions. 
Good examples are the cases pursed on behalf of Iranian companies: 
case T 496/10 Bank Mellat v Council [12] and case T-565/12 National Ira-
nian Tanker Company v Council [13]. 
In case T-496/10, the Court ruled that the reasons for imposing restric-
tive measures against the applicant were insufficient. Moreover, the Court 
decided that the Council failed to disclose to the applicant the evidence con-
sidered to inculpate it. 
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In case T-565/12, the Court ruled that it is the task of the competent 
European Union authority to establish that the reasons relied on against the 
person concerned are well founded, and it is not the task of that person to 
adduce evidence of the negative. As a result, the Court decided that the case 
files did not contain evidence to support the Council’s claims that the appli-
cant was controlled by the Government of Iran and the applicant supported 
the latter financially. Thus, the Court ruled to annul the acts imposing sanc-
tions against the applicant. 
The details of these cases suggest that the arguments used by the Court 
are not likely to be used in the Russian cases. 
The reasons for including Russian companies in the sanction list was 
their close connection to the state (a government stake in the authorised capi-
tal of at least 50 %). The circumstances justifying the listing of these compa-
nies does not include their direct involvement in the Ukrainian events. The 
key reason behind the listing of these organisations was damaging Russia’s 
economy. 
In view of the fact that all the above organisations are largest stakeholders 
in the key industries of the Russian economy, it will be much easier for the 
Council to justify the reasons for listing than it was in the Iranian cases. 
The major questions — as to why the EU holds Russia responsible for 
the Ukrainian crisis and whether the evidence thereof is reliable — will not 
be considered by the Court, because the issues of foreign and security policy 
are beyond the Court’s jurisdiction. 
As to the case of Rotenberg, the claimant has a good chance of winning 
it in court. As mentioned in Council Decision 2014/508/CFSP of July 30, 
2014, Rotenberg is accused, firstly, of being Putin’s old acquaintance and his 
former judo sparring partner, secondly, of that the Russian authorities favour 
him in allocating lucrative government contracts. In particular, Rotenberg’s 
companies were given a number of high-yielding contracts in the framework 
of preparations for the Sochi Olympics. Thirdly, Rotenberg is a shareholder 
of OAO Giprotransmost, which was given the contract for the feasibility re-
port for the construction of a bridge to Crimea, which contributes to the inte-
gration of the peninsula into the Russian Federation and thus undermines the 
territorial integrity of Ukraine. 
The first two reasons for listing Rotenberg cannot be regarded justifica-
tion for imposing restrictive measures against a natural person, for, as com-
mon sense suggests, friendship with the President of Russia and winning gov-
ernment contract cannot be considered illegal activities. As to the third reason 
regarding the feasibility report contract, it is also of a limited evidential effect. 
OAO Giprotransmost is a unique company with a 75-year history and a feasi-
bility report for the construction of a bridge to Crimea can hardly be consid-
ered a violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Moreover, based on the 
general principles of civil legislations, shareholders are responsible for the 
company’s activities only to the extent permitted by applicable law. Therefore, 
this justification is not sufficient for the listing of the applicant. 
However, regardless of the results of the cases challenging the anti-
Russian sanctions, this cases will have great significance both in political 
and legal terms. 
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It is worth stressing that the sanction list was prepared within a limited 
time period using open and unverified information. Therefore, the quality of 
the sanction list is rather low. 
For instance the Guidelines on Implementation of Restrictive Measures 
suggest that the list of persons subject to sanctions should include detailed 
information (surname, first name (also in the language of the person), alias, 
sex, date and place of birth, nationality and address, identification or passport 
number). The sanction list adopted by Council Regulation 2014/658/CFSP of 
September 8, 2014 contains information on certain individuals without pro-
viding data sufficient for identification (full name, date and place of birth). 
For instance, it provides the following information: Oleg Bereza, Alexandr 
Karaman, etc. It is evident that these data can be applicable to a large num-
ber of nationals of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and other post-Soviet states. 
It is worth stressing the mistake made in regard of Vladimir Zhirinovsky. 
It seems that the authors of the Council Decision copied his details from Wiki-
pedia without analysing them. As a result, Council Decision 2014/658/CFSP 
of September 8, 2014 contains the following information: Vladimir 
Volfovich Zhirnovsky, born on 10.6.1964 in Eidelshtein, Kasakhstan. In re-
ality, Zhirinovsky was born on April 25, 1946 in Alma-Ata and Eidelsthein 
was the name of the politician, which he changed on June 10, 1964. This 
mistake was corrected only in November 2014 in accordance with Council 
Decision N 2014/801/CFSP of November 17, 2014 [14]. 
Therefore, one can arrive at the following conclusions: 
1. Technically, the sanctions against Russia were adopted in compliance 
with the EU competence in the framework of an established procedure, but 
without sufficient evidence and based on subjective assessments. 
2. The sanctions against Russia can be divided into three groups: indi-
vidual, sanctions for Crimea and Sevastopol, and anti-Russian economic 
sanctions. 
3. Sanctions against Russia do not correspond to the nature of restrictive 
measures, being a punishment rather than an instrument to bring about a 
change in policies. 
4. Sanctions against certain individuals were adopted without any justi-
fication, without providing sufficient reasons, and based on unverified in-
formation. 
5. The analysis of the current political situation and the particularities of 
sanctions adoption suggests that early abolition of restrictive measures is 
rather unlikely. The chances of Russian companies subject to sanctions to 
win in court are also small. Therefore, one can assume that the restrictive 
measures against Russia will stay in force until their expiration, namely, 
March, June, and July 2015. 
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